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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Restatement Second) sets the
standard for strict tort products liability that has been widely adopted in the United
States.' A business seller is strictly liable if it sells a product that is "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" and the condition causes physical harm to a user
or consumer.2 A defective condition is defined in comment g of that section as "a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer."3 Unreasonably dangerous
is defined in comment i as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." 4 This standard is
generally known as the consumer expectations test.
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which has been almost universally
adopted in the United States, sets forth a standard similar to § 402A for the implied
warranty of merchantability. Goods are unmerchantable under § 2-314(2)(c) ifthey
are not "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."'
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Products Liability
Restatement)eschews the consumer expectations test as the controlling standard for

* W.P. Toms Professor of Law & Walter W. Bussart Distinguished Professor of Tort Law,
University of Tennessee.
1. See John Vargo, The Emperor'sNew Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New
Cloth "forSection 402AProductsLiabilityDesignDefects-A Survey ofthe StatesReveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493 (1996).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
3. Id. cmt. g.
4. Id. cmt. i.
5. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1987); see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTiCLE 2-SALES 68 (Draft, Aug. 10, 2001)
(proposing changes to §2-314).
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determining product design defect.6 Section 2(b) of the Products Liability
Restatement says a product "is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor...." Comment g
to that section states:
Consumer expectations, standing alone, do not take into
account whether the proposed alternative design could be
implemented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design
would provide greater overall safety. Nevertheless, consumer
expectations about product performance and the dangers attendant
to product use affect how risks are perceived and relate to
foreseeability and frequency of the risks of harm, both of which
are relevant under Subsection (b). Such expectations are often
influenced by how products are portrayed and marketed and can
have a significant impact on consumer behavior. Thus, although
consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard
for judging the defectiveness of product designs, they may
substantially influence or even be ultimately determinative on
risk-utility balancing in judging whether the omission of a
proposed alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.'
The consumer expectations test is applied throughout products liability cases,
including those involving design defectiveness. 9 It is probably the central test for
determining a product defect. The other major test, that of weighing risk against
utility, can be comfortably subsumed under consumer expectations. It is therefore
a misapprehension to conclude that the importance of the consumer expectations
test is declining.
Before examining the various definitions, and methods of proof, of consumer
expectations, it is useful to consider the primary objections that have been leveled
against the consumer expectations test. There are two. First, it has been said that the
test is unsuitable where a product defect, or unreasonable danger, is obvious, since
a consumer can allegedly have no expectations of safety with regard to a product
that is obviously dangerous.'0 Second, it has been said that the ordinary consumer
can have no expectations of safety with regard to a complex product, since such

6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. g (1998) [hereinafter
PRODucrs LIABILITY RESTATEMENT]
7. Id. § 2(b).
8. Id. cmt. g (citation omitted).
9. See infra Part III.
10. See JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., PRODucTs LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 188
(1994). Products tort law usually requires that the products be unreasonably dangerous and cause
physical harm to person or property. No such limitations on recovery are imposed under the U.C.C.
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expectations allegedly lie beyond the knowledge of the average person." An
examination of these objections shows that neither is compelling. Both objections
can be accommodated within the consumer expectations test.
I.

THE OBVIOUS DANGER

Many courts, probably a majority, have held that obviousness of danger is not
a legal bar to recovery inproducts liability.'2 It is a factor to be considered by the
fact finder and fits well within the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption ofrisk. In an appropriate case the fact finder may find that contributory
negligence, or at least assumption of the risk, will bar recovery.'" Only in rare cases
should obviousness be a legal bar, and probably those cases should be restricted to
situations where the benefits of a product clearly outweigh its risks.
A claim of product defectiveness based on failure to warn will usually be
ineffective in the case of an obvious danger.' 4 The purpose of a warning is to make
a danger apparent, and that purpose may be fulfilled by the danger's obviousness.
In other product cases, obviousness of danger is usually only one of the factors to
consider in determining defectiveness.'
If obviousness of danger is not generally a legal bar to recovery, then it seems
odd that it should be a bar to a determination of legal defectiveness, however the
standard of defectiveness is defined. Holding that obviousness of danger is not a
legal bar to recovery should imply that the legal test for determining defectiveness
can be met even though the danger is obvious. Otherwise, obviousness would serve
a contradictory role of being both a bar and not a bar to recovery.
Courts appear to have semantic difficulty in conceiving that aperson can expect
a product to be safe when it is obviously dangerous. This difficulty involves a
misunderstanding of the meaning of expectations. A product expectation
contemplates safety which is not present. The absence of safety may be obscured,
or it may be apparent.
Spouses expect each other to improve; parents expect their children to improve;
teachers expect their students to improve. These expectations are often maintained
in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary. Can a worker not expect the safety
conditions of his workplace machinery to improve in spite of having to work, for
example, with an unguarded or improperly guarded punch press?

11. Id. at 189.
12. See JERRYJ. PImLLIPS,PRODUCTSLIABILITYINANUTSHELL 201-04 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
PRODucrs LIABILITY NUTSHELL].
13. Comparative fault has been widely adopted, generally eliminating plaintiff's fault as a bar
to recovery. See id. at 269-78.
14. See, e.g., TENN. CODEANN. § 29-28-105(d) (2000) (stating that failure to warn of an obvious
danger does not cause a product to be unreasonably dangerous).
15. See, e.g., Delany v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 942, 946 (Kan. 2000).
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Expectation may be equated with hope, a close synonym. Expectation implies
more certainty than hope, 16 but both are grounded in an expectancy of soundness,
or wholeness-whether of product, person, or performance.Y

Expectation also has legal overtones of duty or obligation. 8 People are
expected to obey the law. Manufacturers are expected to make safe products.
Vautourv. BodyMasters SportIndustries,Inc.'9 illustrates the point made here.
In Vautour, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected-as have several other

significant stte supreme court decisions 2 -the ProductsLiabilityRestatement's
requirement of proof of a reasonable alternative design as a condition to recovery

for design defectiveness." In doing so it noted that the Products Liability
Restatement itself recognizes situations in which design defectiveness can be

established without proof of an alternative design .22 For example, comment e to § 2
recognizes that there may be liability for harm caused by a "manifestly
unreasonable" design, without proofof an alternative design.' Commentf,the court
said, recognizes that the plaintiffneed not produce expert testimony of an improved

design "in cases in which .the feasibility of a reasonable alternative design is
obvious and understandable to laypersons.

24

In support of the latter proposition, the New Hampshire court cited Pietronev.
American HondaMotor Co.,25 where the California Court of Appeal held that the
plaintiff, a passenger on a motorcycle, established a design defect by showing the

"open, exposed, rotating rear wheel" of the motorcycle "in close proximity to the
passenger's foot pegs. 2 6 Once the plaintiff has established proximate cause,

16. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 407 (10th ed. 2000) ("syn EXPECT,

HOPE, LOOK").
17. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 332, 333 (Roy P. Baster, ed. 1959) ("Fondly do we hope-fervently do we

pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away."). This speech was delivered on
March 4, 1865, a little more than a month before Lee's surrender at Appomattox on April 9,1865. The
quoted sentence shows the close relation between hope and expectation. Southern defeat seemed
foregone by March 4, 1865, but Lincoln, the word master, chose to express his expectation in terms
of hope.
18. "England expects every man will do his duty!" ROBERT SOUTHEY, LIFE OF NELSON 146
(London & Glasgow, Collins Clear-Type Press 1813) (quoting Admiral Nelson at the Battle of
Trafalgar, Oct 21, 1805); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATEDICIONARY, supra note 16, at
407 (defining expect "to consider bound in duty or obligated").
19. 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001).
20. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 1997);
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930,946 (Kan. 2000); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730,
735 (N.Y. 1995); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 752 (Wis. 2001); see also
Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154-55 (Md. 2002) (questioning the acceptability
of §2(b) of the Products LiabilityRestatement).
21. Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1184; PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 2(b).
22. Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183.
23. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 6, § 2 cmt. e.
24. Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183 (citing PRODUCTS LIABILITYRESTATEMENT, supranote 6, § 2 cmt.

0.
25. 235 Cal. Rptr. 137 (Ct. App. 1987).
26. Id. at 139; see Vautor, 784 A.2d at 1183.
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California products law shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show that "the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design."'27 However, the Pietronecourt said:
[E]ven were it to be assumed that plaintiff's burden ...exceeded

such a showing [of proximate cause,] and required that she
demonstrate the existence of some alternative design which would
have prevented or lessened her injury, this burden was met by the
jury's mere inspection of the photographs introduced into
evidence. That is to say, no more than a cursory examination of
this machine's configuration makes apparent both the danger of
its design and potential solutions thereto.2 8
The New Hampshire court in Vautourapproved the examples of pro duct design
defect in comments e andf and in the Pietronecase, but it rejected the Products
Liability Restatement'srequirement of proof of an alternative design.29 Instead, the
court applied the consumer expectations test and held that the plaintiff could
establish a design defect by showing that a leg exerciser was unreasonably
dangerous.3" The user could be injured if the upper stops of the machine were not
in a locked position when doing calf exercises."
Thus, Vautour recognized that the consumer expectations test could be applied
in finding an obviously dangerous design to be defective. 32 The examples cited, to
which the court would presumably apply the consumer expectations test, involved
obvious design dangers. Vautouritself, to which the test was applied, involved an
obvious danger, since the plaintiff was aware of the warning label on the exerciser
machine requiring that the upper stops be in the locked position when doing calf
exercises.33
Delany v. Deere & Co. expressly held that obviousness of danger does not bar
recovery based on consumer expectations.34 There, the plaintiffwas crushed "when
a large round hay bale fell from a homemade bale fork attached to a Deere front-end
loader" which the plaintiff was operating. The court held the plaintiff stated a
claim for defective design.36 According to the Delany court, simply because a
product is obviously dangerous, does not prevent the product from being

27. Pietrone,235 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)).
28. Id. at 139.
29. Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183-84.
30. Id. at 1181-82.
31. Cf.Jamieson v. Woodvard & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (rejecting a warning
and design claim on similar facts, despite a vigorous dissent by Judges Washington, Edgerton,
Bazelon, and Fahy).
32. Vautour, 784 A.3d at 1182.

33. Id. at 1180.
34. 999 P.2d 930, 942, 946 (Kan. 2000).

35. Id. at 932.
36. Id. at 946.
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unreasonably dangerous to the consumer: "A patent and obvious danger may be an
important factor in determining whether plaintiff's fault contributed to his or her
own injury but does not foreclose the inquiry of whether the product was
defectively designed."37
It is often difficult to determine when the unreasonable danger of a product is
obvious.38 Unless a consumer assumes the risk as a matter of law by intentionally
injuring herself, the injury usually occurs inadvertently, or at least in circumstances
where the consumer does not expect to be injured.39 In such a situation, the
consumer does not expect the product, although obviously dangerous, to be
unreasonably so. Rather, she expects the product to be safe enough to be used
without mishap. Her expectations are sadly disappointed when she is proved wrong.
III. THE COMPLEX PRODUCT
Soule v. General Motors Corp." is the leading case indicating that the
consumer expectations test applies only in those cases where the ordinary
consumer, based on her ordinary knowledge, could have expectations of safety.4
There the plaintiff was badly injured when her General Motors (GM) car collided
with another vehicle.42 The plaintiff sued GM alleging the car's defective design
caused "its left front wheel to break free, collapse rearward, and smash the
floorboard into her feet. '4 3 Expert witnesses debated the issues at length, and the
case was submitted to the jury on both the consumer-expectations and the riskbenefit tests.' The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed alleging
that expert testimony should not have been admitted under the consumer
expectations test.45 The appeals court agreed, but found the admission harmless
error since the case was essentially tried on a risk-benefit theory.'

37. Id. at 942.
38. See Jerry J. Phillips, ProductsLiability: Obviousness ofDangerRevisited, 15 IND. L. REV.
797, 799 (1982).
39. Some courts hold that a products liability plaintiffs negligence, amounting to mere
carelessness or inadvertence, should not be considered in determining whether the plaintiff was at
fault. See 2 JERRY J. PHILLIPS & ROBERT E. PRYOR, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §8-18(a) (2d ed. 1995);
PRODUCTs LIABILITY NUTSHELL, supra note 12, at 276.
40. 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
41. This rationale appears to be supported by comment i to § 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinaryknowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 2, § 402A cmt. i (emphasis added).
42. Soule, 882 P.2d at 301.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 302-03.
45. Id. at 303.
46. Id.
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In discussing this issue, the California Supreme Court said:
In Barker,we offered two alternative ways to prove a design
defect, each appropriate to its own circumstances. The purposes,
behaviors, and dangers of certain products are commonly
understood by those who ordinarily use them. By the same token,
the ordinary users or consumers of a product may have
reasonable, widely accepted minimum expectations about the
circumstances under which it should perform safely. Consumers
govern their own conduct by these expectations, and products on
the market should conform to them.
In some cases, therefore, "ordinary knowledge . . . as
to... [the product's] characteristics", may permit an inference
that the product did not perform as safely as it should. If the facts
permit such a conclusion, and if the failure resulted from the
product's design, a finding of defect is warranted without any
further proof. The manufacturer may not defend a claim that a
product's design failed to perform as safely as its ordinary
consumers would expect by presenting expert evidence of the
design's relative risks and benefits.
However, as we noted in Barker, a complex product even
when it is being used as intended, may often cause injury in a way
that does not engage its ordinary consumers' reasonable minimum
assumptions about safe performance. For example, the ordinary
consumer of an automobile simply has "no idea" how it should
perform in all foreseeable situations, or how safe it should be
made against all foreseeable hazards.
An injured person is not foreclosed from proving a defect in
the product's design simply because he cannot show that the
reasonable minimum safety expectations of its ordinary
consumers were violated. Under Barker's alternative test, a
product is still defective if its design embodies "excessive
preventable danger", that is, unless "the benefits of the.., design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." But this
determination involves technical issues of feasibility, cost,
practicality, risk, and benefit which are "impossible" to avoid. In
such cases, the jury must consider the manufacturer's evidence of
competing design considerations, and the issue of design defect
cannot fairly be resolved by standardless reference to the
"expectations" of an "ordinary consumer."
As we have seen, the consumer expectations test is reserved
for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's users
permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum
safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert
opinion about the merits of the design. It follows that where the
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minimum safety of a product is within the common knowledge of
lay jurors, expert witnesses may not be used to demonstrate what
an ordinary consumer would or should expect. Use of expert
testimony for that purpose would invade the jury's function, and
would invite circumvention of the rule that the risks and benefits
of a challenged design must be carefully balanced whenever the
issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the
product's users.47
Tennessee followed Soule in Ray v. BIC Corp.4" In Ray, the four-year-old
plaintiff was injured from a fire caused by a cigarette lighter manufactured by the
defendant.49 The plaintiff alleged the lighter was defectively designed because it
was not "child-resistant.""0 The federal district court granted the defendant summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed."' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified
to the Tennessee Supreme Court the question of whether the Tennessee Code
provided "separate and distinct" tests, consumer expectations and risk-utility, for
determining product defectiveness.5 2 The Tennessee court answered in the
affirmative. 3 The court said the defendant would unquestionably be entitled to
summary judgment on the consumer expectations test because the danger was
obvious, but a jury question was presented on the risk-utility issue.5 4
The Tennessee statute in issue 5 provides that a product can be found
"unreasonably dangerous" if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer," or if the product "because of its
dangerous condition would not be put on the market by a reasonably prudent
manufacturer or seller, assuming the manufacturer or seller knew of its dangerous
condition."'56 The Tennessee court found these to be separate tests, and equated the
second (the prudent manufacturer or seller) test with that of risk-utility.5 7

47. Soule, 882 P.2d 298, at 307-08 (alterations in original) (citations and footnotes omitted); see
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
48. 925 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996).
49. Id. at 528.
50. Id. at 528-29.
51. Id. at 529.
52. Id. The risk-utility test of Ray is the same as the risk-benefit test of Soule. The utility of a
product is the same as its benefit. The risk associated with a product is sometimes referred to as the
product's danger.
53. Ray, 925 S.W.2d at 533.

54. Id. at 530.
55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (2000).
56. Id.
57. Ray, 925 S.W.2d at 531. Tennessee has a third statutory basis for determining defectiveness.
A product manufacturer or seller may be held liable if the product is found to be in a "defective
condition," which "means a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable
handling and consumption." TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(2) (2000). The court in Smith v. Detroit
Marine Eng'g Corp. held that "defective condition" was a separate and distinct basis for recovery,
apart from the two distinct bases set forth in Section 29-28-102(8) under "unreasonably dangerous."
712 S.W.2d 472,474-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). See also Cruze v. Ford Motor Co., Prod. Liab. Rep.
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Although, the Tennessee court recognized that some jurisdictions predicted that
the two tests "should produce similar results," 8 the court saw the two tests as
distinct:
While this prediction may be accurate, we see distinct and
important differences in the consumer expectation and the prudent
manufacturer tests under our statute. First, the former requires the
consumer to establish what an ordinary consumer purchasing the
product would expect. The manufacturer or seller's conduct,
knowledge, or intention is irrelevant. What is determinative is
what an ordinary purchaser would have expected. Obviously, this
test can only be applied to products about which an ordinary
consumer would have knowledge. By definition, it could be
applied only to those products in which "everyday experience of
the product's users permits a conclusion... ." Soule v. General
Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (emphasis in
original). For example, ordinary consumers would have a basis for
expectations about the safety of a can opener or coffee pot, but,
perhaps, not about the safety of a fuel-injection engine or an air
bag.
Alternatively, the prudent manufacturer test requires proof
about the reasonableness of the manufacturer or seller's decision
to market a product assuming knowledge of its dangerous
condition. What the buyer expects is irrelevant under this test. In
contrast to the consumer expectation test, the prudent
manufacturer test is more applicable to those circumstances in
which an ordinary consumer would have no reasonable basis for
expectations. Accordingly, expert testimony about the prudence
of the decision to market would be essential.
The straight-forward, unambiguous language of our itatute
establishes two distinct tests for ascertaining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous: the consumer expectation test and the
prudent manufacturer test. In addition to having completely
different focuses, the two tests have different elements which
require different types of proof. The two tests are neither mutually
exclusive nor mutually inclusive. While the statute does not limit
applicability of the tests, the prudent manufacturer test will often
be the only appropriate means for establishing the unreasonable

(CC-)
15,707 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Tennessee statute does not require both
"defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous"). Apparently no Tennessee court has defined
"defective condition," so it is unclear how the term differs from the two definitions of "unreasonably
dangerous."
58. Ray, 925 S.W.2d at 531 (quoting Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d
160, 164 (1978)).
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dangerousness of a complex product about which an ordinary
consumer has no reasonable expectation. Likewise, it may form
the sole basis for establishing liability for a product whose
dangerousness is the result of a latent defect.5 9
Ray stated that the two tests (consumer expectations and risk-utility) "are
neither mutually exclusive nor mutually inclusive," 6 leaving uncertain the
boundaries of the two tests. In a subsequent case, Jackson v. GeneralMotors
Corp.,61 the Tennessee Supreme Court further conflated the two tests.
In Jackson, the Tennessee Supreme Court accepted from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals the certified question of whether under Tennessee law a plaintiff
may "use the 'consumer expectation test' to prove that his seatbelt/restraint system
was unreasonably dangerous because it failed to conform to the safety standards
expected by an ordinary consumer under the circumstances? 62 The court answered
the question in the affirmative, stating:
Section 29-28-102(8) of Tennessee Code Annotated is silent as to
any limitation on the application of the consumer expectation test
in products liability cases. Absent contrary indication in the
statute, we read Tennessee products liability law to permit
application of the consumer expectation test in all products
liability cases in which a party intends to establish that a product
is unreasonably dangerous. It does not follow that, because the
consumer expectation test may be applied in all such product
liability cases, the manufacturer will be subject to absolute
liability. Whether a plaintiff is successful on a products liability
claim under the consumer expectation test will depend on whether
the trier of fact agrees that the plaintiffs expectation of product
performance constituted the reasonable expectation of the
ordinary consumer having ordinary knowledge of the product's
characteristics.
The issue of whether the consumer expectation test applies to
seat belts was addressed in Cunningham v. Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., No. C-3-88-582, 1993 WL 1367436, at *1 (S.D. Ohio,
June 16, 1993). In Cunningham, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, held that the
consumer expectation test was applicable in a wrongful
death/products liability action where the seatbelt was determined

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001).
62. Id. at 803.
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to have killed the driver in a twenty-to-thirty miles per hour
automobile crash. In its decision, the Cunningham court held:
[S]eat belts generally are familiar products for which
consumers' expectations of safety have had an
opportunity to develop, and the function which they were
designed to perform is well known. In recent years,
consumers have been bombarded with information
regarding the importance of wearing seatbelts because of
the protection which they provide.
IT]his Court is simply not willing to... preclud[e] the
use of the consumer expectation test in a situation
involving a familiar consumer product which is
technically complex or uses anew process to accomplish
a familiar function. Many familiar consumer products
involve complex technology. In addition, manufacturers
are constantly altering the methods in which products
perform familiar functions. Thus, to conclude that the
consumer expectation test cannot be used because a
product is technologically complex or because a new
process is used to achieve a familiar result would be to
significantly reduce the use of that test.... Because of
their long usage and consumer familiarity with the
measure of safety which seat belts provide, consumer
expectations do provide useful guidance.
Id. at *3-4. The above statement in the Cunningham decision is
significant because it recognizes that the consumer expectation
test does not depend necessarily on a product's complexity in
technology or use. Instead, Cunningham recognizes that
successful application of the consumer expectation test by a
plaintiffsimply requires a showing that theproduct's performance
was below reasonable minimum safety expectations of the
ordinary consumer having ordinary, "common" knowledge as to
its characteristics. This entails a showing by the plaintiff that
prolonged use, knowledge, or familiarity of the product's
performance by consumers is sufficient to allow consumers to
form reasonable expectations of the product's safety.
In response to the certified question, we conclude that the
consumer expectation test is applicable to any products liability
case in which a party seeks to establish that a product is
unreasonably dangerous under Tennessee law. We affirm our
decision in Ray ex rel Holman v. BIC Corp. that the consumer
expectation test and the prudent manufacturer test are not
exclusive of one another and therefore either or both of these tests
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are applicable to cases where the product is alleged to be
unreasonably dangerous. However, we recognize here, as we did
in BIC, that it may be difficult for plaintiffs in cases involving
highly complex products to establish that the product is dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an
ordinary consumer, even
though the consumer expectation test
63
may, technically, apply.
Both Soule andBIC-Jacksonleave unclear whenthe consumer expectations test
can be applied in a design case. Jackson indicates that the test may be applied in
any such case, while stating that it may be "difficult" for the plaintiff to establish
'
violation of consumer expectations in cases involving "highly complex products."
It would not be as difficult for a plaintiff to establish the violation of consumer
expectations if she could use expert testimony to do so. Soule states that, "where the
minimum safety of a product is within the common knowledge of lay jurors, expert
witnesses may not be used to demonstrate what an ordinary consumer would or
should expect," because use of such evidence "would invade the jury's function,
and would invite circumvention of the rule that the risks and benefits of a
challenged design must be carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect
goes beyond the common experience of the product's users."6
The first reason offered by Soule for rejecting expert evidence in a consumer
expectations case-that such evidence would "invade the jury's function"--is, as
the court indicates, a reason for rejecting expert testimony as superfluous when the
matter is one within the common knowledge of the jury.66 By definition, a matter
involving a complex product is not within the jury's common knowledge.
The second reason suggests, as did the Ray court, that consumer expectations
and risk-benefit, or risk-utility, are separate and discrete tests.67 However, Jackson
indicates
that the consumer expectations test substantially overlaps that of risk68
utility.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Potterv. Chicago PneumaticTool Co.,69
found that in cases "involving complex product designs in which an ordinary
consumer may not be able to form expectations of safety . . .a consumer's
expectations may be viewed in light of various factors that balance the utility of the

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 804, 806 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
Id. at 804.
Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (citation omitted).
Id. An expert is permitted to testify only if the testimony "will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." FED. R, EvID. 702; see State v. Wooden, 658

S.W.2d 553,556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that an expert witness should not be permitted to
testify about unreliability ofeyewitness identification, since the jury could use its own common sense
to determine the weight to be given such evidence).
67. Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996).
68. Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 804-06 (Tenn. 2001).
69. 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
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product's design with the magnitude of its risks."70 This reasoning makes eminent
sense because the risk-utility test mirrors the reasonable person standard enunciated
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. CarrollTowing Co.,71 except that in
strict products liability the seller's knowledge of the condition of the product is
presumed.72 Thus, properly seen, the risk-utility analysis of a reasonable person is
one way to determine reasonable consumer expectations.
Therefore, the remaining question is whether expert testimony can be used to
establish consumer expectations. Soule appears to answer the question in the
negative. 73 However, in footnotes to the opinion the Soule court says:
Plaintiff insists that manufacturers shouldbe forced to design
their products to meet the "objective" safety demands of a
"hypothetical" reasonable consumer who is fully informed about
what he or she should expect. Hence, plaintiff reasons, the jury
may receive expert advice on "reasonable" safety expectations for
the product. However, this function is better served by the riskbenefit prong ofBarker.There, juries receive expert advice, apply
clear guidelines, and decide accordingly whether the product's
design is an acceptable compromise of competing considerations.
On the other hand, appropriate use of the consumer
expectations test is not necessarily foreclosed simply because the
product at issue is only in specialized use, so that the general
public may not be familiar with its safety characteristics. If the
safe performance of the product fell below the reasonable, widely
shared minimum expectations of those who do use it, perhaps the
injured consumer should not be forced to rely solely on a
technical comparison of risks and benefits. By the same token, if
the expectations of the product's limited group of ordinary
consumers are beyond the lay experience common to all jurors,
expert testimony on the limited subject of what the product's
actual consumers do expect may be proper.
Contrary to GM's suggestion, ordinary consumer
expectations are not irrelevant simply because expert testimony is
required to prove that the productfailed as marketed, or that a
condition of the product as marketed was a "substantial," and
therefore "legal," cause of injury. We simply hold that the
consumer expectations test is appropriate only when the jury, fully

70. Id. at 1333.
71. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
72. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 6(c). This section creates a riskbenefit test to be determined solely by health care providers in deciding whether the design of a
prescription drug or medical device is defective. Id. This test lacks any support in case law.
73. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
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appraised of the circumstances of the accident or injury, may
conclude that the product's design failed to perform as safely as
its ordinary consumers would expect.74

In Lunghi v. ClarkEquipmentCo., cited by Soule, the court held that plaintiffs
"are free to present evidence in the form of expert opinions on the reasonable
expectations of consumers of the product involved here, which is outside the
experience of ordinary consumers."' ' Apparently the harmless error committed by
the trial court in Soule was in instructing the jury that they could find liability based
on ordinary consumer expectations without expert testimony. They apparently
should have been instructed that, on the facts of this case, ordinary expectations had
to be established by expert testimony.
In Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., the Wisconsin Supreme Court
specifically held that expert testimony may be used to establish consumer
expectations regarding the design of a complex product.76 The suit there was against
a latex glove manufacturer for an allergy allegedly caused by exposure to the
defendant's latex gloves.77 The plaintiff, a health care worker, introduced extensive
expert testimony to establish the allergenic quality of such gloves.78 Applying the
consumer expectations test, the court stated that "this court has rejected the
complex
argument that the average jury cannot properly evaluate the often
79
economic and engineering data presented at products liability trials.
It is generally held that expert testimony is admissible in res ipsa loquitur cases
to establish that an accident ordinarily would not have happened had the defendant
used due care."0 The ordinary-occurrence aspect ofres ipsa loquitur is similar to that
of ordinary consumer expectations.
The ProductsLiability Restatement § 3 states the rule for products liability
recovery based on circumstantial evidence: a product defect may be inferred when
the incident that caused harm "was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of
product defect."'" It is widely held that expert testimony is admissible to prove
defect, including a design defect, based on circumstantial evidence. 2

74. Id. at 308 n.4, 309 n.6 (emphases in original) (citation omitted).
75. 153 Cal. App. 3d 485, 496 (Ct. App. 1984). The Soule court discussed, apparently with

approval, three other California Court of Appeal cases: Rosburg v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 181
Cal. App. 3d 726 (Ct. App. 1986), West v. Johnson & JohnsonProds., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d. 831 (Ct.

App. 1985), and Akers v. Kelly Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633 (Ct. App. 1985), where it was held that
expert evidence could be used to determine consumer expectations.
76. 629 N.W.2d 727, 742-43 (Wis. 2001).

77. Id. at 731-33.
78. Id. at 733-35.

79. Id. at 74243.
80. See Mireles v. Broderick, 872 P.2d 863, 866 (N.M. 1994).
81. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 3.

82. See, e.g., Chad E. Wallace & Andrew T. Wampler, Comment, Skimming the Troutfrom the
Milk: Using CircumstantialEvidence to Prove ProductDefects Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability Section 3, Tennessee and Beyond, 68 TENN. L. REv. 647, 673 (2001)

(discussing cases in which expert testimony was admitted to prove a defect based on circumstantial
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Expert evidence is admissible in negligence cases to prove whether the risks of
an activity outweigh its benefits." A negligence determination of risk-benefit, or
risk-utility, is based on the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as
informed by expert evidence. Product consumer expectations can also be based on
a risk-utility calculation, as informed by expert testimony, the difference being that
seller knowledge of the product's condition is presumed in strict products liability.'
The use of expert testimony to establish a prima facie case in civil litigation,
including torts and products liability, is pervasive. The person being informed by
expert evidence in such cases is the fact finder-the lay juror. That is the same
person that needs to be informed of consumer expectations in products liability
cases, where those expectations are not apparent to the ordinary person.
IV. METHODS OF SHOWING CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

The ProductsLiability Restatement § 2 lists three types of product defects:
manufacture, design, and inadequate instructions or warnings.85 The Restatement
excepts design defects from the consumer expectations tests.86 However, as seen in
the preceding section, a number of courts use consumer expectations-either alone
or in conjunction with risk-benefit analysis-to determine design defectiveness.
A manufacturing defect is one where a product "departs from its intended
design."8" Manufacturing defects clearly disappoint consumer expectations ---the
mouse in the coke bottle, the burr in the peas, and so on. A manufacturing defect
presents the paradigm of disappointed consumer expectations.
Where there are inadequate warnings or instructions, again consumer
expectations are clearly violated. The consumer expects that a product is safe for
use, unless instructed or warned otherwise as to the latent dangers.89
Another type of product defect is set forth in the ProductsLiabilityRestatement
§ 9, which carries forward § 402B of the Restatement Second.90 A product is
defective if the business seller makes "a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent
misrepresentation of material fact" concerning a product, causing harm to persons
or property. 9' The U.C.C. has a similar provision in § 2-313, which provides that
a seller can create an express warranty through an affirmation of fact or promise,
evidence).
83. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw TORTS: GENERAL PRiNCiPLES § 4 (Discussion Draft Apr. 5,

1999); DAN B. DOBBs, THE LAw OF TORTS 390 (2000).
84. PRODUcrs LABILrrY NurSHELL, supranote 12, at 14.
85. PRODUCTS LiABirry RESTATEMENT, supranote 6, § 2.
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY NUTSHELL, supranote 12, at 15.

89. The ProductsLiability Restatement also deals with post-sale and successor-corporation
duties to warn. See PRODUCrs LIABiLrry RESTATEMENT, supranote 6, §§ 10, 13.
90. Id.at § 9. This section omitted the public misrepresentation aspect of§ 402B, and made clear
that the section applies to property damage as well as personal injury. See RESTATEMENT SECOND,
supranote 2, § 402B.

91. PRODUCTSLABILiTYRESTATEMBNT, supra note 6, § 9.
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a description of the goods, or a sample or model, which becomes part of the basis
of the bargain.92 A breach of an express warranty, or a misrepresentation, regarding
the goods clearly creates disappointed expectations for a user who is harmed by
reliance on the misstatement. 93
A seller's advertisements and marketing representations can create consumer
expectations similar to those created by express warranties and express
representations. If the goods do not measure up to marketing representations,
liability can result. A good example of liability created by such representations is
found in Denny v. FordMotor Co.94 There the defendant manufacturer represented
its Bronco I sports utility vehicle as safe for on-road use. 95 The plaintiff was
seriously injured when the vehicle rolled over on a highway after she suddenly
applied

the brakes. 96

Although

the jury

found the

benefits

of

the

vehicle-apparently for off-road use-outweighed its risks, it nevertheless found
for the plaintiff based on disappointed implied warranty consumer
expectations-apparently arising from defendant's advertising representations
indicating that the vehicle was safe for on-road use.97
Section 3 of the ProductsLiability Restatement recognizes liability based on
circumstantial proof of defect. 93 Where circumstantial evidence shows a product
injury "of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect," the
expectations of the ordinary consumer are violated. 99 This interpretation is
supported by § 8, which states that liability for harm caused by used products can
be inferred under § 3 where "the seller's marketing of the product would cause a
reasonable person in the position of the buyer to expect the used product to present
no greater risk of defect than if the product were new."'0 0
Section 4 of the Products Liability Restatement sets forth the well-accepted
common law rule that "a product's noncompliance with an applicable product
safety statute or administrative regulation renders the product defective withrespect
to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation... 0 ' The section states
that the rule applies "[i]n connection with liability for defective design or
inadequate instructions or warnings."'0 2 This statement is underinclusive, since a

92. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1987). The particular purpose warranty of§ 2-315 substantially overlaps
the express warranty aspects of§ 2-313. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1987).
93. See also PRODUCTSLIABILITYRESTATEMENT, supranote 6, § 14. This section carries forward
the holding-out concept of the Restatement Second. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supranote 2, § 400.
94. 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995); see also Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that a roasting pan was defective when it was unsafe for the purpose for which it was
marketed).
95. Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 732.
96. Id. at 731.
97. Id. at 738-39.
98. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 3.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 8(b).
101. Id. § 4(a).
102. Id. § 4.
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statute or regulation can also control standards relating to manufacturing defects and
to express warranties or representations. 3
In the negligence area, a statutory violation gives rise to negligence per se on
the part of the violator."° Under § 4, it gives rise to a finding of product defect. 5
A consumer may not consciously expect a product to comply with relevant
statutes and regulations, but the law assures her of that expectation. This assurance
is roughly comparable to the legal expectation of0 6safety that one is entitled to have
with regard to an obviously dangerous product.
Two related situations that give rise to consumer expectations are industry
standards and industry customs, which work similarly to statutory and
administrative regulations. A product user or consumer may or may not be aware
of an applicable custom or voluntary trade regulation. Whether ornot she is aware,
she is nevertheless legally entitled to expect industry compliance with such customs
and regulations.
Another area in which the consumer is legally entitled to expect product
compliance regards the expected life of a product. 7 If the wings fall off a new
airplane, the expectations of a consumer using the plane will quite clearly be
disappointed.'

If expert testimony is required in order to establish the expectable

life of a product- the consumer will nevertheless be legally entitled to expect a
product to comply with such expectable or useful life standard.
Expert testimony is normally presented in products liability by an individual
who is qualified to give an expert opinion based on her specialized scientific,
technical, or practical experience regarding a product. Increasingly, public polling
09
has been used as a method for determining factual disputes in civil litigation,"
and

such polling methods may also come to be used to determine specialized consumer
expectations in products liability.

103. For example, the implied warranty provision of the U.C.C. requires that goods run of even
kind, quality and quantity, subject to variations by agreement, or by custom. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (d)
cmt. 9 (1987). Section 2-314(f) requires goods to "conform to the promises or affirmations of fact
made on the container or label" of the product. U.C.C. § 2-314(f) (1987). The Federal
Communications Commission and Food and Drug Administration extensively regulate consumer
advertising.
104. The effect of a statutory violation is generally to shift the burden ofproof to the defendant
to offer an excuse for the violation. See JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CAsEs, MATERIALs,
PROBLEMS 252 (2d ed. 1997).
105. PRODUCTS LABiLTYRESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 4 cmt. e. Comment e indicates that the
presumption created by § 4 is intended to be conclusive.
106. See supraPart Ill.
107. See Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401,403 (I1. 1969); Mickle
v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 235, 166 S.E.2d 173, 188 (1969).
108. PRODUCTS LAinn.rry RsrATEmENT, supra note 6, § 3 cmt. b.
109. See Alan G. Carlson, UsingSurveys to Prove orDisproveClaims,32 ALI-ABA CLEREv.,
Nov. 30, 2001, at 1.
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V. CONCLUSION

Mark Twain cabled the Associated Press from London in 1897 stating: "The
reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.". ° Similarly, the reports of the death
of the consumer expectations test as a standard for determining products liability
are also greatly exaggerated. The concerns regarding the unsuitability of the
standard for testing obviously dangerous or complex products arise from a
misunderstanding of the test. Indeed, if consumer expectations failed as a test both
for obvious and for complex, non-obvious dangers, there would be little else to
which the test could apply. The first concern can be resolved by a proper
understanding of the meaning of consumer expectations. The second can be
resolvedby the introduction of expert testimony, which is widely used to enable the
ordinary fact finder to resolve complex quasi-legal and factual issues.
The drafters of the Products Liability Restatement were probably largely
motivated to jettison consumer expectations as the central test for determining
product defectiveness because of their desire to establish reasonable alternative
design under § 2(b) as the essentialbasis for determining design defect. Section 2(b)
was the cornerstone of the ProductsLiabilityRestatement from its inception."'
A number of prominent courts have expressly rejected § 2(b) as a basis for
determining design defect." 2 Others reject it either by using consumer expectations
alone or in conjunction with risk-benefit analysis to determine consumer
expectations, without making proof of a reasonable alternative design a sine qua
non for determining such expectations. Risk-benefit analysis fits neatly within the
definition of consumer expectations. Courts widely recognize that expert testimony
may be used to establish consumer expectations. In Potterv. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., the court found that "our independent review of the prevailing common
law reveals that the majority of jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an
absolute requirement to prove a feasible alternative design."".
Courts reject the reasonable-alternative-design standard as the test for
determining liability in design defect cases not so much because the standard often
places a very heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff-although it does do that." 4
Rather, courts, being practical, common-sense institutions, are aware that design
defectiveness cannot be so easily cabined by the alternative-design test. Tort law
is a many-splendored thing. It evolves in response to changing times and
circumstances. Products liability for the last half century has been the crown jewel

110. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980).
111. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402A
ofthe Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512,1520 (1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTs: PRODUcrS LIABILITY §101 (Council Draft No.1, Sept. 17, 1993).
112. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The drafters themselves adopt consumer
expectations, in § 7 of the Products Liability Restatement, as the basis for determining defective
design of food products. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 7.
113. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997).
114. Id. at 1332.
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of tort law. No temporary, conservative backlash is likely to stem the creative
evolution of tort law and products liability.
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